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Abstract
Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on
collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult to compute
inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power distribution as close as
possible to a desired one. This paper considers approximations and exact solutions to this inverse
problem for the Penrose-Banzhaf index, which are obtained by enumeration and integer linear
programming techniques. They are compared to the results of three simple solution heuristics.
The heuristics perform well in absolute terms but can be improved upon very considerably in
relative terms. The findings complement known asymptotic results for large voting bodies and
may improve termination criteria for local search algorithms.
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1 Introduction
Collective decision rules and, in particular, heterogeneous voting weights for members of a committee,
council, or shareholder meeting translate into influence on collective decisions in a nonlinear and even
discontinuous fashion. This can be seen, for instance, by considering a decision quota of q = 50% and
players i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3} whose voting weights are given by either the vector (i) w = (w1, w2, w3) =
(33.3¯, 33.3¯, 33.3¯), (ii) w′ = (50 − ε, 48 + ε, 2), or (iii) w′′ = (50 + ε, 48 − ε, 2) for small ε > 0. The
major weight change from w to w′ does not affect possibilities to form a winning coalition at all, where
coalition S ⊆ N is called winning if the cumulative weight of its members exceeds the quota. Namely,
S is winning if and only if |S| ≥ 2. By symmetry, the distribution of influence can a priori be expected
to equal ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) for either of the voting systems described by (q;w) and (q;w
′). The minor change
from w′ to w′′, in contrast, renders voter 1 a dictator with associated power distribution (1, 0, 0).
Social scientists, philosophers and mathematicians have investigated various voting power indices
which try to quantify the a priori distribution of influence on committee decisions. The Shapley-Shubik
index (Shapley and Shubik 1954) and the Penrose-Banzhaf index (PBI) (Penrose 1946; Banzhaf 1965)
are most prominent, but by far not the only ones.1 They help researchers clarify the non-trivial a priori
power implications of different voting weight assignments to a wider audience. The combinatorial
nature of weighted voting systems can, still, mislead the general public’s intuition and even that of
political practitioners. For instance, it was apparently not noted that the voting weights of the original
six members of the European Economic Community, in use from 1958 to 1973, rendered Luxembourg
a null player whenever the EEC Council applied its qualified majority rule. The public discussion –
very heated in, but not restricted to, Poland and Germany – in the wake of the 2007 EU summit at
1See Felsenthal and Machover (1998) or Laruelle and Valenciano (2008) for overviews.
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which new voting rules for the EU Council were agreed reflected persistent confusion between voting
weights and power.
Even to specialists, the discrete nature of voting rules still poses challenges. This is true, in
particular, for the optimal design of a voting system. Certain normative desiderata, such as the equal
representation of bottom-tier voters in a two-tier voting system, often call for a specific distribution of
voting power. It is then a non-trivial exercise to find a deterministic voting rule that comes as close as
possible to inducing the desired a priori power distribution.2 Simple gradient-like search algorithms,
such as the ones considered by Leech (2002, 2003), Aziz et al. (2007), or Fatima et al. (2008), deliver
excellent results for many instances of this so-called inverse power index problem but have never been
evaluated formally. One can neither rule out that only a local minimum of the distance between the
desired and the induced power vector has been identified. Nor are bounds known on the possible gap
to a globally optimal voting rule. The latter might involve the intersection of several one-dimensional
(q;w)-rules and, therefore, need not even be a feasible result of the applied search algorithm.
Motivated by qualified majority voting in the EU, S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2006, 2007) have
identified an elegant way to approximately solve the inverse problem for moderately big n if the
decision quota q is a free parameter.3 Their heuristic suggestion is particularly appealing because it
avoids discrepancies between voting weight and power. Namely, approximate proportionality between
the normalized weight vector w = (w1, . . . , wn) and the induced PBI B(q;w) is achieved when the
quota is set to q∗ = 12 (1 +
√∑
w2i ). A desired power vector β can hence approximately be induced
simply by choosing w = β and then calculating q∗. Because the rule (q∗;w) is simple and minimizes
possible confusion between voting weight and power, it has motivated the prominent “Jagiellonian
Compromise” (also known as double square root voting system) in the discussion of future voting rules
for the EU Council (see, e.g., Kirsch et al. 2007).
Whether the decision quota q is a free parameter, so that S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski’s optimal
q∗ indeed can be chosen, or not, depends on the application at hand. Even if it can, the lack of
bounds on how well the (q∗;β)-heuristic performs relative to the respective globally optimal solution
to the inverse problem provides motivation for further research. Knowing more about the quality of
the (q∗;β)-heuristic is especially important for situations in which the heuristic can be expected to
perform rather badly. The derivation of q∗ is based on a continuous approximation of the fundamentally
discrete distribution of the cumulative weight of a random coalition. Its use is problematic when this
approximation is inaccurate. This pertains especially – but not exclusively – to “small” voting bodies.
For a given number n of players, the set of different binary voting systems or simple games is finite.
On the one hand, this finiteness implies that many desired power distributions cannot be approximated
too well. Nontrivially, this remains true even for large n: Alon and Edelman’s (2010) results imply
that there is a sequence of desired power distributions {βn}n=1,2,... which stays at least a constant
positive distance away (in the ‖ · ‖1-norm) from any Penrose-Banzhaf power distribution. As shown
in Kurz (2012b), the desired power distributions βn = (0.75, 0.25, 0, 0, . . . , 0) have ‖ · ‖1-distance of at
least 1437 to the PBI of every complete simple game or weighted voting game for 2 ≤ n ≤ 16 players.
On the other hand, the finiteness of the set of simple games suggests a trivial algorithm for solving
the inverse problem: enumerate all systems v with n players, compute the respective power distribu-
tion – say, the PBI B(v) – and then pick a game v∗ that induces the smallest achievable difference
between ideal vector β and B(v) according to a suitable metric.
To this end, a growing literature has investigated methods for the efficient enumeration of voting
systems (see, e.g., Keijzer 2009; Keijzer et al. 2010; Kurz 2012a). But, up to now, even the number
of complete simple games (and also of weighted voting games) is unknown for n > 9. So enumeration
works only for voting bodies with few members. Exact solutions to the inverse problem can, fortunately,
also be obtained for somewhat larger n by integer linear programming (ILP) techniques. Such an
2Non-deterministic rules such as random dictatorship or random quota rules (Dubey and Shapley 1979, sec. 5) can
easily solve the problem, but are generally not regarded as satisfactory.
3For very big n, except in rather pathological cases, the distinctions between voting weight and voting power become
negligible. Limit results for n→∞ which render the inverse problem trivial date back to the seminal work by Lionel S.
Penrose (1946, 1952), and have rigorously been investigated by Lindner and Machover (2004), Chang et al. (2006), and
Lindner and Owen (2007).
2
approach was recently presented in Kurz (2012b). It stands in the tradition of earlier applications of
ILP to electoral systems, as discussed in Grilli di Cortona et al. (1999), Pennisi et al. (2007) or Ricca
et al. (2012).
This paper draws on both methods – complete enumeration and ILP – as well as standard local
search algorithms in order to evaluate the accuracy of three heuristic solutions to the inverse problem
for the PBI. The first heuristic simply combines w = β with q◦ = 50%; the second combines it with
the “optimal quota” q∗ derived by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007); the third uses q¯ = 12 + 1/
√
pin.
The latter quota is the average of q∗ computed over a set of β-vectors which is of particular interest
for the egalitarian design of two-tier voting systems (S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski 2011).
We compute differences between the respective heuristic solution and the exact solution for three
different metrics and a comprehensive grid of target vectors with up to n = 7 voters. We also study
approximations of the exact solutions for a large sample of grid points for 7 < n ≤ 15 as well as se-
lected real-world examples based on the so-called Penrose square root rule and EU population figures.
The results allow the estimation of bounds (and termination criteria) for the accuracy of a candidate
solution which has been obtained by conventional local search methods. This may be useful in applica-
tions where a specific voting power distribution is sought for a moderate number of council delegates,
committee members, or business shareholders. We also analyze the significant magnitude of error that
the mentioned heuristics can produce even for large n in pathological cases.
In the following Section 2 we introduce binary voting systems and their basic properties. The
inverse power index problem is formalized in Section 3, along with a brief discussion of worst-case
bounds. In Section 4 we present the design of our comparative investigation. The corresponding
results are the topic of Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Binary voting systems
We consider binary voting systems, i.e., each voter i ∈ N := {1, . . . , n} casts a binary vote (e.g., “yes”
or “no”) and this determines a binary collective decision. Such a situation can mathematically be
described by a Boolean function v : 2N → {0, 1}, where 2N denotes the set of subsets of N . A coalition
S ⊆ N can, e.g., be interpreted as the set of “yes”-voters for a particular (unspecified) proposal.
Definition 1 A simple game is a monotone Boolean function, i.e., a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} with
v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T , which additionally satisfies v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1.
Coalition S ⊆ N is called winning if v(S) = 1, and otherwise losing. S ⊆ N is called a minimal
winning coalition if it is winning and all proper subsets are losing. Similarly, a maximal losing coalition
is losing and all its proper supersets are winning. A simple game is uniquely characterized by either
its set of minimal winning coalitions or its set of maximal losing coalitions. For a proof and additional
properties we refer the reader, e.g., to Taylor and Zwicker (1999).
As an example consider the simple game v which is characterized by the set
{{1}, {2, 3}} of its mini-
mal winning coalitions. Taking all supersets of the minimal winning coalitions yields
{{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3},
{1, 2, 3}, {2, 3}} as the set of all winning coalitions. The remaining subsets are losing, with the set of
the maximal losing coalitions given by
{{2}, {3}}.
The monotonicity imposed in Definition 1 is a very weak requirement. By introducing Isbell’s
desirability relation, i.e., i A j for two voters i, j ∈ N if and only if v({i} ∪ S\{j}) ≥ v(S) is satisfied
for all {j} ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i} (see, e.g., Isbell 1956), one can define a particularly relevant subclass of the
set of all simple games S:
Definition 2 A simple game v is called complete (also called directed) if the binary relation A is a
total preoder, i.e.
(1) i A i for all i ∈ N ,
(2) i A j or j A i (including “i A j and j A i”) for all i, j ∈ N , and
3
(3) i A j, j A h implies i A h for all i, j, h ∈ N .
In our small example one can easily check that 1 A 2 A 3. So v ∈ C where C ⊂ S denotes the set
of all complete simple games. Note that also 3 A 2, i.e., voters 2 and 3 are equally desirable.
Many binary voting systems which are used in practice belong to a further refinement of S:
Definition 3 A simple game v is weighted if there exist non-negative weights wi ∈ R≥0 and a positive
quota q ∈ R>0 such that v(S) = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q.
A weighted representation of our small example is given by (q;w) = [2; 2, 1, 1]. We call weighted
simple games weighted voting games and denote their collection by W. Every weighted voting game
is complete while not every complete simple game is weighted, i.e., W ⊂ C ⊂ S. But each complete
simple game and even each simple game can be represented as the intersection of 1 ≤ k <∞ weighted
voting games. The minimal number k of weighted voting games is called the dimension of the simple
game in question (see, e.g., Taylor and Zwicker 1999, De˘ıneko and Woeginger 2006). The presently
known enumeration results for the three considered classes of binary voting systems are summarized
in Table 1 (up to isomorphisms). See, e.g., Kurz (2012a) for details.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
#S 1 3 8 28 208 16351 >4.7 · 108 >1.3 · 1018 >2.7 · 1036
#C 1 3 8 25 117 1171 44313 16175188 284432730174
#W 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373 2730164 989913344
Table 1: Number of distinct simple games, complete simple games, and weighted voting games
There are several equivalent representations of binary voting structures besides Boolean functions
and lists of, e.g., minimum winning coalitions. Simple games can, for instance, be described as in-
dependent sets in a graph, and Carreras and Freixas (1996) have introduced a very efficient matrix
parameterization of C. Our computation algorithms will exploit yet another possibility. Namely, we
use that voting systems can be represented as points of a polyhedron which have integer coordinates
only: for each S ⊆ N define 0 ≤ xS ≤ 1 and add the constraints x∅ = 0, xN = 1, and xS ≤ xT for all
∅ ⊆ S ⊂ T ⊆ N . Each integer solution x ∈ {0, 1}2n of this system of linear inequalities is in bijection
to a simple game (with v(S) = xS). Complete simple games and weighted voting games are described
by additional constraints and auxiliary variables for the weights. This allows the investigation of all
three classes of voting games by ILP techniques.
3 The inverse power index problem
Power indices are mappings from a set of feasible voting structures, such as S or W, to non-negative
real vectors which are meant to quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on collective
decisions. The inverse power index problem consists in finding a voting system, e.g., (q;w) ∈ W, which
induces a power distribution as close as possible to a desired one. More formally, for a given number
n of voters, the general inverse power index problem involves a set Γ of feasible voting structures for
n players, a power index φ : Γ → Rn≥0, a desired power distribution β ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑n
i=1 βi = 1, and
a metric d : Rn × Rn → R≥0 which measures the deviation between two power vectors. Of course,
d(x, y) = ‖x − y‖ is a suitable choice for any vector norm ‖ · ‖. Given these ingredients the inverse
power index problem amounts to finding a solution to the minimization problem
min
v∈Γ
d
(
φ(v), β
)
. (1)
In this paper, we consider the special instance of this problem where Γ ∈ {S, C,W}. We include
S and C because they are significantly larger domains for n ≥ 5 (see Table 1) and some prominent
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real-world electoral systems fail to correspond to weighted voting games. Examples include the current
voting rules (Treaty of Nice) and the future ones (Treaty of Lisbon) for the EU Council, which are 3-
and 2-dimensional, respectively. We take the (normalized) Penrose-Banzhaf index B(v) as the voting
power index of interest.
Definition 4 For a given n-player simple game v the absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index B′i(v) for player
i is defined as
B′i(v) =
1
2n−1
·
∑
∅⊆S⊆N\{i}
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
The (normalized) Penrose-Banzhaf index (PBI) Bi(v) for player i is defined as
Bi(v) =
B′i(v)∑n
j=1B
′
j(v)
.
Our distance computations will be based on the ‖ · ‖1-norm (i.e., the sum of deviations between
Bi(v) and βi for all players i), the ‖ · ‖∞-norm (i.e., the maximum deviation), and a weighted version
of the former. Section 4 will provide more details.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists only one (non-trivial) non-approximative result on how
well the inverse problem can be solved for the PBI in the worst case. It is useful for later reference to
rephrase this rather recent finding by Alon and Edelman (2010):
Theorem 1 (Alon-Edelman) Let n > k be positive integers, let ε < 1k+1 be a positive real, and let
v be a simple game with n voters. If
∑n
i=k+1B(v, i) ≤ ε, then there exists a simple game v′ with k
voters such that
k∑
i=1
|B(v, i)−B(v′, i)| +
n∑
i=k+1
|B(v, i)− 0| ≤ (2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε + ε.
So given a “large” game v with n players in which 1 − ε of the total PBI (normalized to one)
is concentrated amongst k < n “major” players, it is possible to ignore the n − k “minor” players,
i.e., compute the PBI in the smaller game v′ amongst the major players only, and make an error (in
the ‖ · ‖1-norm) of no more than the stated bound. As an example, consider the power distribution
βn = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn≥0 for n ≥ 2 and choose k = 2, ε = 118 . Let v be a simple game
involving n players with
∑n
i=3Bi(v) ≤ ε = 118 , From Theorem 1 we conclude the existence of a simple
game v′ involving k = 2 players with ‖B(v) − B(v′)‖1 ≤ (2k+1)ε1−(k+1)ε + ε = 718 (with B(v′) extended
naturally from R2≥0 to Rn≥0). The ‖ · ‖1-distance between β2 and the three possible 2-player PBI
vectors B(v′) ∈ {(1, 0), ( 12 , 12 ), (0, 1)} is at least 12 . We, therefore, have
‖B(v)− βn‖1 ≥ ‖B(v′)− β2‖1 − ‖B(v)−B(v′)‖1 ≥ 1
2
− 7
18
=
1
9
.
If otherwise
∑n
i=3Bi(v) ≥ ε then ‖B(v) − βn‖1 ≥
(
1 − B1(v) − B2(v)
)
+ ε ≥ 2ε = 19 . Hence, βn
cannot be approximated by the PBI of a simple game with an ‖ · ‖1-error less than 19 . The latter is the
sharpest possible bound obtainable from Theorem 1. It can be improved computationally to slightly
more than 1437 for n ≤ 11 on S and for n ≤ 16 on C and W (see Kurz 2012b).
4 Design of the computational investigation
When the inverse problem arises in political applications of constitutional design, PBI vectors β which
are proportional to the square root of a population size vector p play an elevated role. The reason is
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that – under the probabilistic assumptions which underlie the PBI – a binary voting system v with
B(v) = β and
βi =
√
pi∑n
j=1
√
pj
. (2)
would equalize the voting power of citizens in a two-tier system in which n delegates adopt the bottom-
tier majority opinion of their respective constituency i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and then cast a wi-weighted vote
in a top-tier assembly (e.g., the EU Council). See Penrose (1946), Felsenthal and Machover (1998),
Kaniovski (2008) or Kurz et al. (2012) for details. We will consider this Penrose square root rule for
varying n and some historical population figures in order to select target vectors β in our computations.
In principle, however, any vector in Rn≥0 whose entries sum up to 1 might be a desired power
distribution β. For instance, the partners of a non-profit R&D joint venture might have made relative
financial contributions of
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
9 ,
1
9 ,
1
9
)
and possibly want to align a priori voting power to this vector
as well as possible. Ideally, for a given number n of voters, one would like to compare the exact and
heuristic solutions to the inverse problem for all possible normalized target vectors β ∈ ∆(n − 1),
where ∆(n−1) denotes the n−1-dimensional unit simplex. Because this is computationally infeasible,
we complement our analysis of some politically motivated vectors by vectors β from a finite grid on
∆(n− 1). And we resort to approximations of the exact solution when n is too large.
We will compare the (approximated) exact solution of the inverse problem on domain S, C, or W
for a given desired PBI β with three different heuristics. They stay in the class W of weighted voting
games and have in common that voting weights are set equal to the desired voting power, i.e., w = β.
They pick a distinct quota, and hence typically a different voting system v ∈ W.
The first heuristic – referred to as the 50%-heuristic – just chooses q◦ = 12 . Simple majority is
arguably the most common majority rule in practice. The 50%-heuristic simply picks it and ignores
the potentially large discrepancies between voting weight and voting power that can arise.
The second, more sophisticated heuristic has been suggested by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2006,
2007). Their motivation was to implement PBI vectors proportional to the square root of population
sizes in the European Union, but the heuristic applies to arbitrary target vectors. Namely, the q∗-
heuristic selects the quota
q∗ =
1
2
·
(
1 +
√∑
i
w2i
)
for an arbitrary w = β ∈ ∆(n−1). S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007) derive this quota by considering
the random weight W which is accumulated if all coalitions S ⊆ N are equiprobable, as the PBI’s
probabilistic justifications suppose. Equiprobability at the level of coalitions is equivalent to assuming
that each voter i ∈ {1, . . . , n} joins the formed coalition independently of the others with probability
1
2 . The mean of W hence is µ =
∑n
i=1
1
2wi =
1
2 and its variance is σ
2 = 14
∑n
i=1 w
2
i . Being the sum of
independent bounded random variables, W is approximately normally distributed if n is sufficiently
large and each of the weights is sufficiently small.4 Assuming that this is the case and, therefore, that
the discrete random variable W can be replaced by the continuous one W˜ , the inflection point of the
corresponding normal density of W˜ is located at q∗ = µ+σ. Since the second derivative of W˜ ’s density
vanishes at q∗, one can approximate the density by a linear function with reasonably high accuracy.
This linear approximation then allows to establish approximate proportionality of B(q∗;w) and w. We
refer to S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007) for details.
Our final heuristic, which we will refer to as the q¯-heuristic, replaces q∗ by
q¯ =
1
2
+
1√
pin
.
This quota approximates the expected value of q∗ when β is proportional to the component-wise square
root of a population size vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) which is drawn from a flat Dirichlet distribution (see
S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski 2011). The motivation for computing such an average is the following:
4A key technical requirement is maxj wj 
√∑n
i=1 w
2
i .
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even though the q∗-heuristic can approximate the Penrose square root rule (2) very transparently for
a given population distribution p, frequent changes in the population would call not only for frequent
changes of the heuristic’s preferred voting weights w but also of the quota q∗. That current voting
weights in the EU already recur to population figures, which are updated on an annual basis, suggests
that weight changes may be regarded as unproblematic. A varying decision threshold – perhaps
q = 65% in one year, q′ = 61% in the next, then q′′ = 67%, etc. – however seems politically less
palatable. It may then make sense to average q∗ over a wide range of values for w = β ∝ √p, and
the q¯-heuristic simply assumes that all population distributions p ∈ ∆(n − 1) are equally likely.5
Because q¯ → 12 as n → ∞, the 50%-heuristic is the limit of the q¯-heuristic and can be viewed as an
approximation of it for not too small n.
Let us remark that investigations by Kurth (2008) have called attention to numerical problems
when heuristics which involve irrational voting weights and quotas, as the q∗ or q¯-heuristics commonly
do, are implemented. Rounding after, e.g., 4 decimal places can result in voting systems which differ
significantly from what was intended. Because it is impractical to deal with weights of a hundred
decimal places or more, it is attractive to work with the underlying Boolean functions or integer points
of a suitable polyhedron as long as possible, and to determine minimal integer weights w and a quota
q which jointly represent a given v ∈ W when needed.6 We use this approach here whenever possible,
and refer the interested reader to Freixas and Molinero (2009) or Kurz (2012a).
We calculate the globally optimal solution to the inverse problem for a given target PBI β by
complete enumeration of the elements in the respective class of binary voting systems for n ≤ 7 (see
Table 1). For larger n, we mostly focus on approximations of the exact solution. These are obtained
either by a fast local search algorithm or, preferably, by ILP techniques. How the latter are used is
explained in the Appendix. The implemented ILP-based algorithm in principle yields globally optimal
solutions but is interrupted for computation time reasons when a desired precision has been reached.
The key idea is to consider the integer polyhedron which contains all simple games whose PBI is less
than a given factor α > 0 away from the desired vector β. If this polyhedron is empty, no such game
exists and α needs to be raised. If not, α can be lowered. The minimal level of α or an approximation
with desired precision, together with the corresponding voting systems, can thus be found by the
bisection method.
In evaluating the quality of the mentioned heuristics, we consider distances to the desired power
vector, β, and to the globally optimal one, B(v∗), in three different metrics. The first one is the metric
d1(x, y) := ‖x−y‖1 =
∑n
i=1 |xi−yi| induced by the ‖ ·‖1-norm, which is also considered in Theorem 1.
The second is the metric induced by the ‖·‖∞-norm, i.e., d∞(x, y) := ‖x−y‖∞ = maxi∈{1,...,n} |xi−yi|.
We refrain from also considering the Euclidean metric induced by the ‖ · ‖2-norm, which has been
considered, e.g., by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007). The reason is that this would turn the ILP
formulation of the inverse power index problem into a binary non-linear programming one. This would
be considerably harder to solve and add relatively little information because ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖2 ≤
√
n‖x‖∞
for all x ∈ Rn.
More interesting, in our view, is a variation of d1 which takes the Bernoulli model that underlies
the PBI and Penrose’s square root rule seriously. This model assumes that all bottom-tier voters in
constituency i ∈ {1, . . . , n} cast a “yes” or “no” vote equiprobably and independently of all others.
The probability for one of pi individual voters in constituency i to be pivotal for the constituency’s
aggregate decision – i.e., to induce the i-delegate at the top-tier council to cast voting weight wi in
favor of “yes” by individually voting “yes”, and “no” by voting “no” – is approximately
√
2/(pipi).
The joint probability of a given voter being pivotal in his constituency i and of this constituency
being pivotal at the top tier is hence Bi(v) ·
√
2/(pipi). This is why the square root PBI vector in
equation (2) equalizes the indirect influence of citizens on collective decisions across constituencies. If
5The expected value of the p-specific optimal quotas q∗(p) for a particular (e.g., Dirichlet) distribution of p, of course,
need not coincide with the quota that is optimal when p is treated as a random variable. Stochastic optimization
techniques are likely to yield a somewhat better q-heuristic than the one suggested by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski
(2011).
6A minimal integer representation of a weighted voting game has the additional advantage that the PBI and other
power indices can be computed most efficiently.
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one now weights any deviation between the probability for a given voter in constituency i to be doubly
pivotal and the egalitarian ideal of βi ·
√
2/(pipi) with βi =
√
pi/
∑n
j=1
√
pj equally, then the total
misrepresentation associated with the top-tier voting system v amounts to
n∑
i=1
pi ·
∣∣βi −Bi(v)∣∣ ·√2/(pipi) = c · n∑
i=1
√
pi ·
∣∣βi −Bi(v)∣∣
for c > 0. Whenever the desired vector β is derived from Penrose’s square root rule and a vector p
which represents EU population data, we will, therefore, also consider the variation of metric d1 which
weights absolute deviations by the square root of relative population, i.e., study the metric7
d′1(x, y) :=
n∑
i=1
√
pi∑n
j=1 pj
· |xi − yi|.
5 Computational results
In this section we present our numerical results. Subsection 5.1 considers the EU Council of Ministers
as a prototype of a real-world weighted voting system. We then look at the entire space of possible
power distributions for n ≤ 7 and a random sample thereof in Subsection 5.2. In order to study
analytically how deviations between heuristics and actual optimization depend on n, we investigate a
particular parametric example in Subsection 5.3.
5.1 Examples of real-world weighted voting systems
We consider the (EEC or EC or) EU Council of Ministers in the years 1958, 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995,
2006, and 2011 with respectively n ∈ {6, 9, 10, 12, 15, 25, 27} members. The historical population data
for n ∈ {6, . . . , 15} are taken from Felsenthal and Machover (1998, sec. 5.3), the data for n ∈ {25, 27}
are official Eurostat figures downloaded on 19.01.2012. The desired power distribution β is computed
by Penrose’s square root rule (see equation (2)).
In Tables 2–4 we compare the three considered heuristics under different metrics with the optimal
solution of the inverse power index problem, where we distinguish S, C, and W as the set of feasible
voting structures. Besides the absolute deviations measured in the respective metric we also report a
relative measure: if the deviation of a certain heuristic is given by δ and that of the optimal solution
v∗ ∈ S is α – this is the unavoidable absolute “error” associated with the given instance of the inverse
problem – then the tables report the avoidable error (δ − α)/α relative to global optimization in S
(labeled S-error in the tables). A value of 1, e.g., means that the heuristic’s approximation error is
twice the unavoidable one. The “†”-symbol indicates that the stated value is not computationally
proven to be optimal: for simple games and n = 9, for instance, we stopped the ILP solution process
after memory usage of 31 GB and 18461700 branch-and-bound nodes; for n = 10, we interrupted after
301 GB and 16735508 nodes. Light figures for S or C represent lower bounds inferred from W, and
“∞” entries indicate deviations by factors greater than 500.
Independently of the chosen metric,8 the tables show: (i) the approximation errors of the heuristics
and the optimal solutions in W (and a fortiori in C and S) tend to zero as n increases; (ii) except
for n = 9, the q∗- and the q¯-heuristics perform noticeably better than the 50%-heuristic; (iii) the q∗
and q¯-heuristics produce comparable errors for n ≤ 15 but differ significantly for n > 15; (iv) the
respective optimal weighted games v∗∗∗ ∈ W yield deviations that are only moderately higher than
those of v∗ ∈ S; and (v) the relative errors of the heuristics compared to either v∗ ∈ S or v∗∗ ∈ W are
sizeable even for small n ≤ 15 and become huge for n > 25.
7Consideration of a similar variation of d∞ broadly confirms the comparisons based on d1, d′1, and d∞.
8Note that the three metrics behave differently when, e.g., distance between (1, 0, . . . , 0) and ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
) ∈ ∆(n− 1)
is considered for increasing n. Deviations should, therefore, be compared only within and not across tables.
8
v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W 50%-heuristic q∗-heuristic q¯-heuristic
n d1 d1 d1 d1 S-error d1 S-error d1 S-error
6 0.051857 0.051857 0.051857 0.300398 4.79 0.091100 0.76 0.091100 0.76
9 0.005294† 0.008641 0.010359 0.065528 11.38 0.060195 10.37 0.069792 12.18
10 0.002639† 0.004840 0.072186† 0.038751 13.68 0.033229 11.59 0.026466 9.03
12 0.002344† 0.002937† 0.005170† 0.028700 11.24 0.019827 7.46 0.019827 7.46
15 0.000476 0.000476 0.000476† 0.026742 55.18 0.006820 13.33 0.006361 12.36
25 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000† 0.019422 “∞” 0.000744 “∞” 0.003096 “∞”
27 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000† 0.018003 “∞” 0.000633 “∞” 0.002457 “∞”
Table 2: Performance for Penrose square root targets in the d1-metric (1958–2011 EU data)
The last observation is probably the most interesting: whenever one seeks an optimal solution
of the inverse power index problem, all three heuristics are unsatisfactory from a pure operations
research perspective. The heuristic solutions can be improved by very large factors, and this becomes
more rather than less pronounced as n grows. Of course, from an applied point of view the absolute
approximation errors get so small for large n that they may be regarded as negligible. But they may
still be relevant. In order to see what a deviation at the 5th decimal place means consider, e.g., the
Penrose square root power distribution β27 for the EU Council from 2011 and compare it to β27′ which
would result if 50000 people moved from Germany to France or were mis-counted in the statistics.
Then ‖β27 − β27′‖1 ≈ 0.0000634.
v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W 50%-heuristic q∗-heuristic q¯-heuristic
n d′1 d
′
1 d
′
1 d
′
1 S-error d′1 S-error d′1 S-error
6 0.018967 0.021487 0.021487 0.110284 4.81 0.027465 0.45 0.027465 0.45
9 0.001902† 0.002752 0.003513 0.019015 9.00 0.018935 8.96 0.017643 8.28
10 0.000803† 0.001502† 0.001909† 0.008893 10.07 0.007325 8.12 0.005489 5.84
12 0.000309† 0.001164† 0.000810† 0.007840 24.37 0.004005 11.96 0.004005 11.96
15 0.000152 0.000152 0.000152† 0.007790 50.26 0.001230 7.09 0.001554 9.23
25 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000† 0.004874 “∞” 0.000213 “∞” 0.000751 “∞”
27 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000† 0.004411 “∞” 0.000176 “∞” 0.000578 “∞”
Table 3: Performance for Penrose square root targets in the d′1-metric (1958–2011 EU data)
v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W 50%-heuristic q∗-heuristic q¯-heuristic
n d∞ d∞ d∞ d∞ S-error d∞ S-error d∞ S-error
6 0.014948 0.014948 0.014948 0.082758 4.54 0.032728 1.19 0.032728 1.19
9 0.001498† 0.001840 0.002240 0.019238 11.84 0.015909 9.62 0.023179 14.47
10 0.000575† 0.001500† 0.001960† 0.011574 19.13 0.006316 9.98 0.009721 15.91
12 0.000229† 0.000580† 0.000865† 0.007940 33.67 0.005756 24.13 0.005756 24.13
15 0.000066 0.000066 0.000066† 0.005923 88.74 0.001798 26.24 0.001202 17.21
25 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000† 0.003834 “∞” 0.000173 “∞” 0.000384 “∞”
27 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000† 0.003434 “∞” 0.000156 “∞” 0.000277 “∞”
Table 4: Performance for Penrose square root targets in the d∞-metric (1958–2011 EU data)
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5.2 Finite grid of objective vectors
Every vector in Rn≥0 whose entries sum to 1 can, in principle, be a desired power distribution in a
specific context. We approximate this infinite space by a discrete grid. We impose β1 ≥ β2 ≥ . . . ≥ βn
and let the desired power of the first n− 1 voters be an integral multiple of s = 0.01.9 So given n and
s, a finite set of desired power distributions arises, which we call grid points.10 Table 5 reports key
statistics for the distribution of unavoidable deviations from the ideal vectors in the d1 and d∞-metrics:
its median, average, 10%, 5%, and 1%-percentile. The deviation figures are based on the respective
exact solutions in W for n ≤ 7 and approximations thereof for larger n. A number of grid points
in parentheses indicates the size of the considered random sample whenever only a subset of all grid
points could be dealt with. The deviation statistics in the corresponding row (in light color) involve
a sample error in addition to the small error of using a conventional local search algorithm instead of
global optimization in W.
#grid d1-metric d∞-metric
n points med. av. 10% 5% 1% med. av. 10% 5% 1%
2 51 0.240 0.245 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.120 0.123 0.020 0.010 0.000
3 858 0.240 0.229 0.100 0.073 0.027 0.120 0.115 0.050 0.037 0.013
4 7519 0.160 0.162 0.087 0.067 0.040 0.070 0.071 0.040 0.030 0.017
5 41334 0.100 0.112 0.060 0.052 0.033 0.040 0.042 0.023 0.020 0.011
6 160668 0.066 0.077 0.040 0.036 0.021 0.022 0.025 0.013 0.011 0.008
7 477213 0.041 0.051 0.026 0.021 0.017 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.007 0.005
8 (10000) 0.042 0.046 0.026 0.023 0.017 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.005
9 (10000) 0.032 0.035 0.020 0.018 0.014 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.003
10 (10000) 0.025 0.027 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.003
11 (10000) 0.020 0.022 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002
12 (10000) 0.016 0.018 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001
13 (10000) 0.013 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
14 (10000) 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
15 (10000) 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Table 5: Distribution of unavoidable absolute deviations d1(β,B(v
∗) and d∞(β,B(v∗)
Tables 6–8 report analogous statistics for the distribution of absolute distances for the three heuris-
tics (considering each grid point for n ≤ 11 and samples from the respective grid for n > 11). A
comparison of the respective deviation statistics with those in Table 5 confirm the observations that
were made for the very specific grid points derived from Penrose’s square root rule in Section 5.1: the
average and each reported percentile of the avoidable deviations decrease in n. They can be regarded
as small in absolute terms, but they are sizeable in relative terms. Again the 50%-heuristic is clearly
outperformed (in the sense of first order stochastic dominance) by the q∗ and q¯-heuristics for n ≥ 3.
5.3 Analytical example
That relative deviations between the considered heuristics and globally optimal solutions need not
disappear for n→∞ can be seen very transparently by considering the desired power distribution
βn :=
1
2n− 1(
n−1 twos︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2, 1)
9The desired power of the n-th voter is implied by the sum condition.
10Step size s has to be chosen with care: the number of grid points can be intractably great already for small n if s
is too small. But a larger s induces a coarser grid of feasible target vectors. This becomes more and more problematic
as n increases because of the corresponding natural decrease of an individual voter’s relative power (on average equal to
1/n). Choosing s = 0.03, for instance, would result in only 297 different grid points (i.e., distinct power distributions
with β1 ≥ β2 ≥ . . . ≥ βn and βi = kis for ki ∈ N) for n = 17 as opposed to 1297 points for n = 8.
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#grid d1-metric d∞-metric
n points med. av. 10% 5% 1% med. av. 10% 5% 1%
2 51 0.480 0.480 0.080 0.020 0.000 0.240 0.240 0.040 0.010 0.000
3 858 0.563 0.562 0.200 0.140 0.060 0.282 0.281 0.100 0.070 0.030
4 7519 0.427 0.512 0.207 0.160 0.087 0.210 0.251 0.087 0.067 0.037
5 41334 0.340 0.446 0.165 0.129 0.077 0.150 0.208 0.063 0.049 0.029
6 160668 0.293 0.383 0.129 0.105 0.067 0.117 0.173 0.045 0.036 0.023
7 477213 0.240 0.330 0.102 0.081 0.053 0.093 0.146 0.033 0.026 0.016
8 1145180 0.200 0.289 0.080 0.064 0.043 0.076 0.127 0.025 0.019 0.012
9 2320234 0.170 0.256 0.066 0.053 0.036 0.064 0.112 0.019 0.015 0.009
10 4094767 0.147 0.230 0.056 0.045 0.031 0.055 0.101 0.016 0.012 0.008
11 6449747 0.129 0.210 0.049 0.040 0.028 0.048 0.092 0.013 0.010 0.006
12 (100000) 0.031 0.036 0.020 0.018 0.014 0.008 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.003
13 (100000) 0.026 0.029 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002
14 (100000) 0.022 0.024 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.002
15 (100000) 0.019 0.021 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002
Table 6: Distribution of absolute deviations for the 50%-heuristic
#grid d1-metric d∞-metric
n points med. av. 10% 5% 1% med. av. 10% 5% 1%
2 51 0.480 0.480 0.080 0.020 0.000 0.240 0.240 0.040 0.010 0.000
3 858 0.380 0.425 0.160 0.107 0.040 0.190 0.213 0.080 0.053 0.020
4 7519 0.340 0.366 0.160 0.120 0.060 0.145 0.170 0.065 0.050 0.025
5 41334 0.271 0.306 0.133 0.107 0.066 0.110 0.134 0.052 0.040 0.024
6 160668 0.220 0.256 0.108 0.087 0.058 0.085 0.108 0.037 0.030 0.020
7 477213 0.180 0.216 0.084 0.069 0.046 0.065 0.089 0.026 0.021 0.014
8 1145180 0.150 0.183 0.063 0.051 0.034 0.053 0.074 0.019 0.015 0.010
9 2320234 0.125 0.157 0.048 0.038 0.025 0.043 0.063 0.013 0.010 0.006
10 4094767 0.104 0.137 0.036 0.028 0.018 0.035 0.055 0.010 0.007 0.004
11 6449747 0.087 0.121 0.028 0.021 0.013 0.029 0.049 0.007 0.005 0.003
12 (100000) 0.017 0.021 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001
13 (100000) 0.012 0.015 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001
14 (100000) 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000
15 (100000) 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
Table 7: Distribution of absolute deviations for the q?-heuristic
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#grid d1-metric d∞-metric
n points med. av. 10% 5% 1% med. av. 10% 5% 1%
2 51 0.280 0.327 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.140 0.164 0.020 0.010 0.000
3 858 0.320 0.334 0.140 0.100 0.040 0.160 0.167 0.070 0.050 0.020
4 7519 0.300 0.305 0.150 0.113 0.060 0.130 0.138 0.065 0.050 0.025
5 41334 0.247 0.261 0.132 0.101 0.060 0.100 0.109 0.050 0.040 0.023
6 160668 0.200 0.220 0.103 0.085 0.056 0.075 0.086 0.035 0.028 0.019
7 477213 0.153 0.181 0.077 0.063 0.043 0.055 0.067 0.024 0.020 0.013
8 1145180 0.117 0.148 0.056 0.046 0.032 0.040 0.052 0.016 0.013 0.009
9 2320234 0.093 0.125 0.042 0.034 0.024 0.030 0.043 0.012 0.009 0.006
10 4094767 0.073 0.106 0.031 0.025 0.017 0.023 0.036 0.008 0.006 0.004
11 6449747 0.065 0.094 0.025 0.020 0.013 0.021 0.032 0.006 0.005 0.003
12 (100000) 0.017 0.021 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001
13 (100000) 0.012 0.015 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001
14 (100000) 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
15 (100000) 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
Table 8: Distribution of absolute deviations for the q¯-heuristic
for n ≥ 2.11 For any quota q ∈ Ij1 := 12n−1 · (2j − 1, 2j], where 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 and j ∈ N, the PBI of
the smallest constituency is exactly zero and, by symmetry, the PBI of the other constituencies equals
1
n−1 . For the remaining possibilities q ∈ Ij2 := 12n−1 · (2j, 2j+ 1] where 0 ≤ j ≤ n−1, all constituencies
have a PBI of 1n . Denoting the corresponding weighted games by v
n
1,j and v
n
2,j one obtains
d1
(
vn1,j , β
n
)
=
2
2n− 1 ,
d1
(
vn2,j , β
n
)
=
2
2n− 1 ·
n− 1
n
,
d∞
(
vn1,j , β
n
)
=
1
2n− 1 , and
d∞
(
vn2,j , β
n
)
=
1
2n− 1 ·
n− 1
n
.
So independently of the quota the ‖ · ‖1-error is 22n−1 +O
(
n−2
)
and the ‖ · ‖∞-error is 12n−1 +O
(
n−2
)
.
The q∗ and q¯-heuristics prescribe quotas of
q¯ =
1
2
+
1√
pin
, and
q∗ =
1
2
+
√
4n− 3
4n− 2 ,
respectively. They and q◦ = 50% fall into Ij1 and I
j
2 for infinitely many n. Thus, all three rules
render the smallest constituency a null player infinitely many times as n→∞, just as it happened to
Luxembourg in the EEC Council between 1958 and 1973.
In contrast, there is always a simple game whose PBI attains βn exactly for 6 ≤ n ≤ 13. And we
conjecture that this remains true for n ≥ 14. Approximation results for complete simple games and
the heuristic choice of w = βn with an “optimal” quota q that leads to vn2,j (abbreviated as q-heuristic)
are summarized in Tables 9 and 10. Since the unavoidable error in the class of simple games S (and
hence of finite intersections of weighted games v ∈ W) is zero for 6 ≤ n ≤ 13 and presumably beyond,
11The construction is inspired by a sequence of weighted voting games to which the Penrose limit theorem (see fn. 3)
does not apply.
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v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W q-heuristic
n d1 d1 d1 d1 C-error
2 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.000000
3 0.266667 0.266667 0.266667 0.266667 0.000000
4 0.214286 0.214286 0.214286 0.214286 0.000000
5 0.038647 0.158730 0.158730 0.177778 0.120000
6 0.000000 0.113636 0.113636 0.151515 0.333333
7 0.000000 0.085470 0.085470 0.131868 0.542857
8 0.000000 0.066667 0.066667 0.116667 0.750000
9 0.000000 0.064171 0.064171 0.104575 0.629630
10 0.000000 0.061042 0.061042 0.094737 0.552000
11 0.000000 0.052158 0.052158 0.086580 0.659944
12 0.000000 0.047254 0.047254 0.079710 0.686856
13 0.000000 0.042353† 0.044483† 0.073846 0.743590
Table 9: Deviations from βn in the d1-metric (analytical example)
we consider the C-error in order to evaluate the relative performance of the q-heuristic. Interestingly,
the C-error in the d1-metric seems to converge to a constant while it seems to grow without bound for
the d∞-metric.
v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W q-heuristic
n d∞ d∞ d∞ d∞ C-error
2 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.000000
3 0.133333 0.133333 0.133333 0.133333 0.000000
4 0.107143 0.107143 0.107143 0.107143 0.000000
5 0.019324 0.050505 0.050505 0.088889 0.760000
6 0.000000 0.034759 0.034759 0.075758 1.179487
7 0.000000 0.022624 0.022624 0.065934 1.914286
8 0.000000 0.015686 0.015686 0.058333 2.718750
9 0.000000 0.014199 0.014199 0.052288 2.682540
10 0.000000 0.008772 0.008772 0.047368 4.400000
11 0.000000 0.008282 0.008282 0.043290 4.227273
12 0.000000 0.007688 0.007688 0.039855 4.183908
13 0.000000 0.005373† 0.007083† 0.036923 5.871952
Table 10: Deviations from βn in the d∞-metric (analytical example)
6 Conclusion
The computations which we have reported in Section 5.1 confirm that if one wants to implement
the Penrose square root rule for population data from today’s European Union, the q∗-heuristic of
S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski and, to a lesser extent, the even simpler q¯-heuristic perform very well in
absolute terms. That is, the distance between a (normalized) square root target distribution β and
the PBI B(q∗, β) is close to zero. However, the considered heuristics can still be very far from the
globally optimal solution to the inverse problem in relative terms. This finding applies even when only
weighted voting games are allowed as feasible solutions. And it is not restricted to small voting bodies,
but holds for the current number of EU members n = 27.
The extensive computations reported in Section 5.2 confirm this observation. They provide the
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first systematic evaluation of the unavoidable deviations between arbitrary target PBI power vectors
and those that are actually implementable for voting bodies with up to n = 15 members. Numbers
such as the ones reported in Table 5 can potentially be useful in order to improve termination criteria
for local search algorithms (e.g., Leech 2002, 2003), which have been used in applied studies. If, say, a
locally optimal candidate solution for an inverse problem with n = 11 voters has a d1-deviation from
the desired vector β greater than 0.020, then Table 5 indicates that the odds of further improvements
in the class of weighted voting games are 50:50 and search presumably should continue in a different
part of the game space. If, however, the deviation is smaller than 0.009, then the odds are rather 1:99;
termination might then make sense.
That desired PBI distributions which concentrate a major share of relative power amongst a few
voters pose problems for the considered heuristics is not surprising. After all, the derivation of q∗
by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007) supposed a technical condition (see fn. 4) from which one can
conclude wj = βj ∈ O(1/
√
n), i.e., the PBI of a single voter should approach zero as least as fast as
1/
√
n. It is much less obvious, however, that (i) it is not sufficient to have a target vector β without
“outliers” in order to obtain a heuristic solution that is good relative to the exact one and (ii) the
relative errors may get larger rather than smaller as n increases. This emerged from the extensive
numerical computations reported in Sections 5.1–5.2 and has also been demonstrated for a specific
analytical example in Section 5.3. One might, therefore, summarize our findings as justifying and
potentially even calling for case-specific optimization rather than the application of a generally rather
good heuristic – not only for small but even for large voting bodies.
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Appendix: ILP formulation for the inverse Penrose-Banzhaf
index problem
The following ILP formulation considers the inverse problem on the class of simple games S and for the
d1-metric. Adaptations to C or W and d′1 or d∞ involve further variables and (modified) constraints,
but are otherwise very similar:
xS ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊆ N, (3)
xS ≤ xT ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ N, (4)
x∅ = 0 (5)
xN = 1 (6)
yi,S ∈ {0, 1} ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, S ⊆ N\{i}, (7)
yi,S = xS∪{i} − xS ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, S ⊆ N\{i}, (8)
si ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (9)
si =
∑
S⊆N\{i} yi,S ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (10)
s =
∑n
i=1
si, (11)
δi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (12)
δi ≥ si − βi · s ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (13)
δi ≥ −si + βi · s ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (14)∑n
i=1
δi ≤ α · s. (15)
The binary variables xS define a Boolean function v via v(S) = xS ; inequalities (3)–(6) ensure that
they represent a simple game. The binary auxiliary variables yi,S = xS∪{i} − xS which are introduced
in (7)–(8) for all i ∈ N and ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i} satisfy yi,S = 1 if and only if coalition S is a swing for
voter i. With this the number of swings si for each player i is determined in equality (10). Since the
PBI for voter i is given by Bi(v) = si/
∑n
j=1 sj , the objective is to minimize the d1-distance
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣ si∑nj=1 sj − βi
∣∣∣∣∣.
Unfortunately, the quotient cannot be linearized. We, therefore, introduce s =
∑n
i=1 si in inequality
(11) and capture δi ≥ |si − βi · s| by inequalities (13) and (14).12 Instead of directly minimizing the
sum of all δi we introduce the constraint (15) for a constant α ∈ [0, 2]. Here, α = 2 reflects the
supremum of d1-distances between elements of ∆(n − 1), and α = 0 corresponds to identity of B(v)
and desired vector β.
It remains to note that if the ILP (3)–(15) has a solution, then the corresponding simple game v
approximates the desired power distribution β with an error of at most α in the ‖·‖1-norm. Otherwise,
no such approximation is possible. We can hence minimize the deviation by performing bisections on
α. Since s lies between n and m
(
n
m
)
< n2n where m =
⌊
n
2
⌋
+1 (see, e.g., Felsenthal and Machover 1998,
sec. 3.3) two distinct PBI vectors differ, both in the d1- and the d∞-metric, by at least
(
1
n2n
)2
. We
hence only need O(n) bisections on α. The computations were been carried out using the Gurobi 4.6
and the IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.4 software packages.
12Interestingly, one can easily linearize the analogous inverse problem for the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSI). So
even though the PBI is easier to compute than the SSI, the corresponding inverse problem is slightly more difficult.
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